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Early in the twentieth century the German-speaking Czech-Jewish writer Franz Kafka wrote
a disturbing story about the metamorphosis of an office worker. In The Metamorphosis (Die
Verwandlung) the main protagonist, Gregor Samsa, awakens from troubled dreams to find
himself transformed into a grotesque oversized form of ‘vermin’ (Ungeziefer).1 No explana-
tion is ever given for Gregor’s misfortunes and he never awakens from the nightmare that his
life has become. He dies a prisoner in the four walls of his home, unappreciated by all but
his sister, a sad and pathetic victim of neglect and social ostracism.
It is not surprising that Kafka’s The Metamorphosis is often read as a particularly pre-
scient parable of the fate of the millions of European Jews who, like Gregor Samsa, found
themselves turned into a race of verminlike creatures by National Socialist propaganda
and racial policies. For millions of Jews too there was no awakening from the nightmare of
the Third Reich, there was no redemption and liberation came too late.
Around the same time that Germany elected a Social Democrat (SPD) – Green govern-
ment to power in 1998, Kafka’s parable was subjected to a provocative new reading in which
Gregor Samsa was compared not to the Jews but to the Germans at the end of the Second
World War. The re-reading of The Metamorphosis occurred in the context of a very public
speech delivered by one of Germany’s most polemical contemporary writers, Martin Walser,
on the occasion of his being awarded a prestigious prize. Walser was to be presented with
German book trade peace prize at the Frankfurt Book Fair in the autumn of 1998, a prize
awarded annually to a writer, artist, philosopher or scientist for an outstanding contribution
to peace. Previous winners include Albert Schweitzer, Ernst Bloch, Yehudi Menuhin and
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Jürgen Habermas, and the recipient in 2003 was Susan Sontag. The year before Walser was
awarded the prize, the winner was Nobel prize winner-to-be Günter Grass, in many ways
Walser’s arch-rival, who had used the public occasion to deliver a hard-hitting speech about
Germany’s omissions with regard to asylum seekers. Hence, it came as no surprise that Walser
set out to provoke with his acceptance speech and to attract maximum media attention. The
speech was broadcast on national television and excerpts were printed in major daily
newspapers. The congratulatory speech with its allusions to Kafka was given by Frank
Schirrmacher, a prominent conservative journalist with a similar penchant for scandal to
Walser. Schirrmacher was the journalist largely responsible for discrediting the entirety of
East German literature and its writers from Christa Wolf to the Prenzlauer Berg group of
underground poets after the fall of the Wall, calling more generally for an end to the post-
war paradigm of littérature engagée.2
The controversy that both Walser’s and Schirrmacher’s remarks predictably sparked, now
referred to as the Walser–Bubis debate, centred on ‘Auschwitz’—as the term that Germans
tend to use when referring to the Holocaust—and how Germans should remember the crimes
of the Nazi past. At the time, the Walser–Bubis debate was widely seen as a disturbing sign
of a conservative backlash that did not augur well for the in-coming Schröder government
and the new Berlin Republic. Especially in the context of other contemporaneous debates
about the building of a Holocaust memorial, it looked very much like a left-wing govern-
ment had ushered in a conservative era in memorial politics, which threatened to under-
mine the decade-long struggles of the German Left for a more thorough and rigorous engage-
ment with the Nazi past. For Germans, who had watched the previous Kohl government’s
clumsy and often half-hearted attempts at honouring the sufferings of the victims of the Holo-
caust, the Walser–Bubis debate was an unexpected throwback to the mid-1980s. It seemed
as if the memory of the Nazi past was being contested yet again and from a section of soci-
ety where one would least expect it. To an Australian observer, accustomed to the Howard
government’s extreme reluctance to acknowledge past guilt in relation to the stolen gener-
ations, the Walser–Bubis debate also came as a shock because it appeared to shatter all faith
in the ability of the Left to confront issues of national guilt and shame head on. What seemed
interesting about Germany back in 1998 was the way that a new left-wing European
government approached the question of collective memory and a tainted national past in
relation to national identity.
Schirrmacher’s introduction to Walser’s speech obviously called for its own set of polemics.
In his remarks, Schirrmacher sets out to upset the dominant readings of Kafka’s The Meta-
morphosis by turning the story’s putative referent on its head. He reads Kafka not as a prophet
of the Holocaust and The Metamorphosis not as a story about the fate of the European
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Jewry, a fate that, incidentally, also befell Kafka’s sisters and family members. Instead, he
brushes the tale against the grain of prevailing political correctness and reads it as a fable
about the fate of ordinary Germans: Germans, that is, of the likes of Martin Walser.
Walser belongs to the generation of Germans that was just old enough towards the end of
the Second World War to be called up for active service. Born in 1927, Walser was drafted
into the army as a young man during the last stages of the war. He emerged from the experi-
ence virtually unscathed, with everything but his youthful innocence intact. It is for this
reason, Schirrmacher argues, that Walser, like his characters, must surely know what it is
like to lose one’s identity overnight and wake up transformed into something as abject as
Gregor Samsa. Schirrmacher’s argument is that the metamorphosis of Germans, after the
Second World War, into a nation of culprits was the formative experience of Walser’s
generation; those born in the 1920s and 1930s awoke from youthful illusions at the end of
National Socialist rule to find themselves metamorphosed in the eyes of the world into ‘some-
thing verminlike’, into a nation of willing executioners, perpetrators and mass murderers.
At the end of his speech Schirrmacher goes on to include Walser’s fictional heroes in his
list of victims. A similar fate had befallen Walser’s ordinary, mostly male middle-class heroes
that had claimed the life of Gregor Samsa, he goes on to argue. ‘No-one should be envied for
waking up in bed as a Walser hero’, he exclaims, since to be white, middle-class and male
is, in Schirrmacher’s eyes, obviously an unenviable fate.3 (One cannot help wondering whether
this is because Walser’s heroes have been afflicted with a curse far worse than death, possi-
bly with the ‘curse’ of having to live on or simply with the shame of having survived the war.
Or perhaps it is because life must go on for Walser’s heroes, one way or another, as it did for
Walser himself, something that Schirrmacher conveniently overlooks.) Schirrmacher is
nothing but persistent in his rewriting of history and takes the increasingly preposterous
Kafka analogy one step further. Like the somewhat sentimental characters in Walser’s books,
the middle-aged writers, lawyers and public servants—ordinary Germans—are victims too,
he would have us believe, because like Gregor Samsa, Walser’s heroes all have jobs to hold
down and families to support.4
Schirrmacher’s new mythology of victims and perpetrators is unsettling, not least because
it obscures the ending of Kafka’s story. Apart from the surface similarity of the shock of the
rude awakening to a new identity, the analogy between the archetypical Walserian hero and
Gregor Samsa soon strains credibility. By contrast with Gregor Samsa, who starves to death
holed up in his room, and the six million Jews who perished in the Holocaust, Walser and
his heroes have choices: choices between sleeping on or waking up from their nightmares,
choices between life and death.
It was little surprise that Schirrmacher’s metamorphosis of Kafka’s famous story into a
parable about ordinary Germans and Walser’s speech that followed it incited a bitter debate
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that was to attract much international attention. Jürgen Habermas described the whole affair
as an embarrassing sign of ‘indigestion from an undigested past which regularly rises from
the belly of the Federal Republic of Germany’.5 An undigested past was, as every German
familiar with the writings of the Frankfurt School philosophers knows, likely to repeat itself
on you; if not confronted it will return to haunt the nation in the form of the ‘return of the
repressed’. The debate was seen as an omen of transformation in the way in which the Holo-
caust featured in collective memory in Germany. It spoke of the will to forge a new relation-
ship to the past and possibly of a new reluctance on the part of Germans to remember the
crimes of genocide. And yet the messages the debate sent were by no means clear-cut. On
one hand, the Walser–Bubis debate looked very much like a telltale sign that the postwar
German consensus about the Holocaust had begun to crack. If the Holocaust has figured, as
Dirk Moses has suggested recently, as a negative myth of origins for Germans since the 1980s,
and even longer for the German Left, then the debate appeared to challenge this negative
myth of origins. The Holocaust, it seemed to be saying, might no longer be a source of his-
torical legitimacy for the building of a new postwar German national identity.6 On the other
hand, however, the dispute was open to interpretation. Was it not possible that this was
evidence of how robust public rituals of memory in Germany were or, put another way,
of how ‘normal’ the Germans as a nation of people had become? Were the memorial
practices in question in fact not fragile but robust precisely because they were open to per-
petual contestation? If this were the case, it would be wrong to infer from the Walser–Bubis
debate that Germany is now prone to collective bouts of selective amnesia or that the Berlin
Republic marks the inauspicious beginnings of a new culture of denial and forgetting. Are
debates about memory of the Nazi past still about whether the crimes of National Socialism
are unique in the history of civilisation, as was the case with the Historikerstreit (historians’
debate) of the mid-1980s? Or is there something else at stake in more recent debates about
the Holocaust?
In the remainder of this essay I want to focus on two recent debates in Germany from the
same inaugural period of Germany’s SPD–Green government, which both have as their focus
the contestation of memory in relation to the Holocaust. In both debates the Holocaust serves
as a negative myth of origin and a primal phantasmatic scene of guilt and shame around
which German national identifications are organised. The first is the Walser–Bubis debate
and the second the much more protracted but no less fierce debate about the building of a
Holocaust memorial in Berlin, which peaked around the same time. Both debates are impor-
tant in the German context because they come at the end of a long period of Christian Demo-
cratic (CDU) rule and at the beginning of a new SPD era in German politics. They are signifi-
cant, moreover, because they appear to send contradictory messages about German self-
understanding to the international community.
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welcomed the ‘normalisation’ of Germany, especially if it leads to Germany assuming greater
moral responsibility on the international stage in preventing human-rights abuses and
genocide.52 But as Germany’s official pacifist stance on the Iraq war, and its Foreign Min-
ister’s repeated threat of a no vote on the UN Security Council have shown, Germany is a far
cry from a normal nation with a normal history. Ironically, the Iraq war has shown that a
majority of Germans are quite happy not to be considered a ‘normal’ nation with a normal
past, particularly if this normalisation means that it must be expected to engage in armed
combat without the legitimacy of a UN resolution. Indeed, the Iraq war offers a paradigmatic
example of how a type of ‘negative nationalism’ that is rooted in critical memory of the
past and an acknowledgment of past guilt can, paradoxically, contribute to fostering a sense
of national pride, even in a shameful past. It has demonstrated that national pride and nation-
al self-understanding does not have to mean forgetting a tainted past and denying the dis-
continuities and ruptures in the nation’s history. Curiously, the overwhelming support in
Germany for not participating in the Iraq war illustrates Habermas’s point that a negative
myth of origins coupled with a sense of pride in the nation’s recent democratic traditions, or
what he has called, controversially, ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Verfassungspatriotismus), does
not have to be a stumbling block in the search for a more positive sense of national identity.
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In the broader context of calls in the 1990s, particularly on the Left, for Germans to redis-
cover national pride and to embrace a more positive sense of national identity, any discussion
of Auschwitz, or the Holocaust, goes to the heart of what it means to be German today. Both
of the debates under discussion here demonstrate the tensions in forging a new, more positive
sense of national identity that does not disavow the legacy of a genocidal past. They thus
reveal the degree to which Germans struggle to attain ‘normality’ in the face of a past that
explodes all myths of positive continuities between past and present. As part of the public
process by which this so-called ‘normality’ is being negotiated today, the debates point to
some of the problems that negative myths of origin have posed for Germans. They highlight
some of the difficulties Germans have had in reconciling desires for ‘normality’ and
‘normalisation’ with a growing acceptance on both sides of politics of the need to respect
and commemorate Holocaust victims’ sufferings.
More generally, these two examples from Germany are instructive beyond the national
context for the way in which they illuminate some of the difficulties that perpetrator nations,
as well as nations with a recent criminal history such as Australia, can have in negotiating
public memorial practices and managing their rituals of remembrance. The challenge facing
the Berlin Republic is one that many nations with a tainted past face, as they seek to recon-
cile the demand for greater ‘normality’ and more positive symbols of national belonging, on
the one hand, with the moral and ethical impulse to keep the memory of a criminal or shame-
ful past alive, on the other. Moreover, the German case study is helpful in an Australian con-
text because it offers insights into some of the difficulties a political generation with no first-
hand experience of past crimes has in dealing with the legacy of this past and in fashioning
its own distinctive culture of memory. Potentially, it also offers a way out of some of the dilem-
mas that successive political generations face when confronted with these questions.
In his acceptance speech, delivered to an audience of prominent members of the com-
munity in the Gothic surrounds of the Paulskirche in Frankfurt, Martin Walser raised the
question of the uses and abuses of the Holocaust in the public arena. According to Walser
‘Auschwitz’ had been turned into ‘moral club’ that was wielded for political purposes.7 It
had been instrumentalised in moral and ethical debates, he argued, trivialised by mass media
representations, by empty ritualised forms of remembrance and insincere acts of lip-service:
‘Everyone knows our historical burden, our everlasting shame,’ and no day passes, Walser
continues, ‘on which we are not reminded of it’.8 Auschwitz was routinely staged as a threat,
with the result that he had been forced to ‘look the other way’. Indeed, he had found him-
self forced to ‘look the other way’ ‘at least twenty times’ or more in the face of the ‘perpetual
presentation of our shame’.9 The charge of looking the other way was, of course, the accusation
levelled at ordinary Germans who turned a blind eye to the deportation, incarceration and
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Walser gives us no indication how personalised acts of remembrance stand in relation to
public acts of memory: whether they are informed by the national template for remembrance
or whether they are intended to challenge its hegemony.
At worst, Walser’s speech can be seen as extreme disingenuousness. He was most certainly
not talking in the Paulskirche in his capacity as a private individual, who finds his own per-
sonal history not adequately reflected in the national story. He was speaking as a public intel-
lectual. As a writer of some considerable reputation and in possession of substantial amounts
of symbolic and cultural capital, Walser was also seeking reassurance on his currency as a
public intellectual. Thus in many ways, his intervention in the Paulskirche was an attempt
to assert his symbolic capital (possibly against other stakeholders in the literary field, such
as Günter Grass) and to shape the direction of national debates about Germany’s past.
Schirrmacher’s role in the debate was to give Walser’s speech a political context and to
recuperate its revisionist tendencies for Schirrmacher’s own conservative agenda. Schirr-
macher instrumentalises Walser’s speech in an effort to pull the terms of the debate about
myths of origins back to the Right. After the regime change in 1998, Schirrmacher may have
had concerns that the Left-liberal consensus on the Holocaust, which had fought for domi-
nance over the previous decades, would be given official legitimacy by the incoming
government. By 1998, the Left-liberal consensus on the Nazi past was already firmly
entrenched such that the only tactic available to Schirrmacher was to argue that ordinary
Germans too were victims of National Socialism. If we accept the view that the centrality
of the Holocaust in public memory in Germany was no longer seriously in dispute in
1998, then Schirrmacher’s strategy after 1998 is not to dispute that the Holocaust happened
or that it was the foundational experience for Germans in the postwar period. Instead, what
he challenges is the content and make-up of the perpetrator trauma. He does so by calling
for the inclusion of the trauma of ordinary Germans into the national phantasm.
Ultimately, the Walser–Bubis debate is less a troublesome sign of a political or anti-Semitic
backlash than evidence of the ‘disputational culture’ (Streitkultur) that has been a domi-
nant feature of postwar Germany. But both debates can be seen as evidence of the process
by which norms about the nation and its memory are disputed and negotiated as Germans
strive to achieve a sense of ‘progressive normality’ and a feeling of equal belonging in the
international community of nations. But however healthy the process may be, there is always
a good deal of fallout from public feuds and interventions such as these, and the loss of faith
among Germany’s Jewish community has been one of the least desirable effects of Walser’s
speech. Moreover, the desired normality of Germany is today still very much in contention,
with many Germans decidedly uncomfortable about what this normality will look like and
whether normality means that Germans will become less inhibited about articulating
latent racism and anti-Semitism. Many American Jews, most notably James E. Young, have
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murder of the Jews during the Third Reich. Since the Holocaust, the gesture of looking the
other way has become more or less synonymous with moral capitulation.
Walser’s speech was greeted by unanimous applause from all of the invited guests bar one,
the now deceased Ignaz Bubis (1927–99), the chairman of the Committee for Jews in
Germany, who was sitting in the front row. While he refrained from spoiling the occasion,
Bubis was quick to retaliate, accusing Walser later of committing ‘intellectual arson’. In the
weeks that followed, an embittered argument unfolded that was later to be described by
Schirrmacher, somewhat hypocritically since he had been one of the instigators of the feud,
as the ‘most painful’ dispute of the 1990s. Walser was joined by politicians and prominent
intellectuals, who had varying interpretations of Walser’s agenda. Some saw it as a form of
historical revisionism and sympathised with Walser, applauding his courage in voicing his
frustration at the political correctness of the media. Some, like Monika Maron, a dissident
writer from the former East Germany, even praised Walser for attempting to correct a moral
imbalance between Jews and Germans and chastised Walser’s critics for trying to censor him.
Summarising the impact of the debate, Schirrmacher wrote in 1999 that it appeared as if the
major protagonists of the quarrel were taking their leave from the public stage. The con-
troversy was like a last duel ‘that left only injured behind but no victors or vanquished’. 10
Indeed, for one of the participants, it was to be a final public intervention because a year
later Bubis passed away.
To the frustration of his critics, Walser refused to name names and identify specific causes
that had instrumentalised Auschwitz. Was he referring to the compensation claims of the
labourers forced to work in German industry under the Nazis, which were under negotia-
tion at the time, as Bubis had perhaps inferred? Or was Walser alluding to the instrumen-
talisation of Auschwitz in debates about euthanasia and the ethics of biotechnology and stem-
cell research? And who were the elusive ‘opinion soldiers’ who wielded their moral clubs
at the troops of reluctant mourners? Walser was irritatingly vague about what had forced
him to look away time after time. It was only in reference to the planned Berlin memorial to
the murdered Jews in Europe that Walser allowed himself to become concrete. The cementing
of the ‘centre of the capital city’, he claimed, was a ‘nightmare the size of a football field’. The
monument was not merely a prime example of the ‘perpetual presentation of our shame’,
it was ‘a monumentalisation of our shame’. Memory in the public domain, he concluded, had
become an ‘obligatory exercise’, an inauthentic form of penance that had lost its meaning.
Only as a matter of private conscience, in the form of personal recollection, could memories
of the Holocaust be kept alive and protected from the harsh world of politics.
The point about the misuse and instrumentalisation of the Holocaust in political debate
is hardly new, as commentators were quick to point out.11 Surely, his critics asked, Walser’s
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Our generation … grew up with the formula ‘consensus’. In the meantime we have got to
the stage where we can recognise that it is the dispute (Streit) that binds us together. The
pluralisation of positions, even in matters of the right form of memory, is, in itself, nothing
harmful. I regard the potential for contestation that was recently unleashed by Walser as
part and parcel of a functioning democratic disputational culture (Streitkultur).50
Only through an open-ended process of debating and determining normativity, that is,
through the ideal of open and ‘powerfree’ dialogue, which both Habermas and the Assmanns
see as the hallmark of a functioning critical democratic public sphere, can Germany agree
on its norms of public memory.
Pierre Bourdieu has pointed out that cultural disputes are the means by which certain sec-
tions of the political classes seek to assert their dominance, or social capital, over others.
Debates about the Holocaust and its place in public memory are just one of the many and
varied ways by which German intellectuals today seek to validate their ideological and poli-
tical positions through telling their respective versions of the national story. They do so,
according to Bourdieu, in power struggles aimed at the accumulation and assertion of symbolic
capital over competing sections of the intelligentsia. The Walser–Bubis debate represents
one recent attempt by German intellectuals and politicians to reformulate the terms in which
the German national debate about the Holocaust has been cast.
The Walser–Bubis debate eventually proved that the debate was not about relativising the
crimes of the Holocaust or about its singularity in modern history, as was the case with
earlier revisionist debates. The debate was partially about the struggles among Germany’s
intelligentsia over symbolic capital; at its most primitive, it was about Walser versus Grass,
and their respective politics and versions of the past. At its most sophisticated, the debate
was about myths of origins. What Walser appeared to be objecting to were the mono-
dimensional ways in which Germans are generally inscribed into the perpetrator trauma and
primal scene of national identification of the Holocaust. The most charitable interpretation
of Walser’s speech is that he was arguing for greater plurality and inclusivity in the nation-
al story and for greater variation in the perpetrator story, much in the way that the Assmanns
argue. At best, he could then be seen as putting the case for a more truly dialectical approach
to resolving contradictions between personal and public memory, allowing for individual
deviations to the dominant national narrative and for personalised responses to official
versions of the past. Walser’s remarks on the necessity for individualised forms of memory
in the aftermath of his acceptance speech support this:
I will not allow myself to be told how to remember. Perhaps I did not make it clear enough
that [I think] there should be public memory. But how every individual feels and what kind
of conscience he and his family and children should have, that must be left up to him.51
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lament at the perpetual staging of Germany’s disgrace in the media was not aimed at the pre-
ponderance of programs about the Third Reich on television. It is hard to see how the
smattering of documentaries about the war and Jewish life on the French–German cross-
cultural channel ‘arte’ could be seen as intrusive, especially when Walser had thirty other
channels to choose from in the deregulated, privatised world of German television. Or, as
one scathing commentator suggested, had one of his children stolen his remote control?12
Not only Bubis condemned Walser’s plea for remembrance as a form of private confession
and penance. For many observers, the pietistic politics of memory implied by Walser’s inward-
looking form of ‘conscience-gazing’ was only too reminiscent of the fateful stance taken by
some intellectuals who stayed in Germany during the Third Reich. Walser’s distinction
between public and private reminded some of the distinction that Martin Heidegger drew
between private, authentic forms of being and inauthentic (uneigentlich) acts of public
remembrance.13
If memory, like one’s conscience, is a private thing, as Walser would argue, this evades the
real issue at stake in his speech about how nations are to organise their rituals of remem-
brance. Walser rather petulantly refuses to make a distinction between recollection as a
private act and as a collective remembrance, between each individual’s need to make peace
with his or her own sense of guilt and the needs of a collective to commemorate official acts
of heroism and shame. He implies, moreover, that there is complicity between public remem-
brance and forgetting. And more worryingly, he overlooks the need for solidarity with the
victims of history and their right to preserve the memory of their suffering. In a bizarre twist
of history, Walser appropriates the vulnerability of the victims for ‘ordinary’ Germans like
himself. He blames the Holocaust industry for seeking to ‘hurt’ decent conscience-stricken
Germans and for denying Germany the right to normality. Essentially, he tries to argue that
normal Germans can lay claim to victimhood too, and that these ordinary ‘victims’ are the
victims of the ‘Auschwitz moral police’. Where Walser’s outburst differs from other more
recent reflections on the theme of Germans as victims, such as in Günter Grass’s recent novel
Crabwalk,14 is in the way he apportions blame for the omission. Whereas Grass wants to
reproach himself for failing to address the topic of the sufferings of German refugees earlier,
Walser singles out the Holocaust industry.
In many ways the Walser–Bubis debate represents a litmus test of changing levels of
tolerance in the self-understanding of the German nation. It also marks a change in
German–Jewish relations that has been welcomed by some as a more normal form of engage-
ment with the Jewish community in Germany, but condemned by others as an unhealthy
sign of the continuation of the ‘negative symbiosis’ that has characterised German–Jewish
relations since the Enlightenment.15 Over the last two to three decades Walser has made
quite a reputation for himself, not as the ‘moral conscience of the nation’, but more as an
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ways. As Salomon Korn has repeatedly argued, a memorial need not stand in opposition
or even in competition to authentic sites of remembrance; both forms of memory ought to
augment and complement each other.47
Eisenman likes to think of the monument as a place where private and public remem-
brance converge. It employs none of the habitual Holocaust symbolism and does not seek
to represent the Holocaust in personalised, accessible ways, or through recourse to stereo-
typed figures of victims and liberators. The place has no centre, no focus, and there will be
no guided tours available. Each individual must experience it alone, just as each Jew was
subjected to the ‘terror of loneliness’ under the Nazis. From the outside it looks deceptive,
like a field of corn frozen in time. Inside the maze, Eisenman hopes, the memorial will be
unsettling and disorienting, and will thus be able to evoke a little of the experience of the
Jews ‘inside’ the Third Reich.48 Part of the criticism of the model stems from its unconven-
tionality and abstractness, and because it appears to have no content. People often feel safer
with memorial sites that have unambiguous messages and familiar iconography that can
be easily understood. They often feel more at ease with monuments that leave nothing to
chance, even if the messages are constantly rewritten and retold.
The metamorphosis of Germany’s memorial culture into a culture of forgetting did not
eventuate, as many feared, at the time of the Walser–Bubis debate. As Habermas has reasoned,
Germany was able to relieve itself of the ‘indigestion from an undigested past’ thanks to
the intervention of a prominent Jewish businessman in Bubis. Habermas’s point here is that
only through constant and sustained public debate, as the means by which stakeholders
articulate their interests, can the norms of the public sphere be negotiated.
Public debates about the past hold a special significance in the psychic life of the nation
because contested memories of the past are always about the present and the future of the
nation. As Aleida and Jan Assmann argue:
There are private, personal memories … They often stand in opposition to what is being
said in public discourse. On the other hand, we have to realise that memories always have
a function in the public sphere … What is remembered in the present always stands in
relation to this present, one could say: it is always instrumentalised. The remembered past
always serves to legitimate or to delegitimate the present.49
Cultural memory (das kulturelle Gedächtnis) is, according to them, the contested terrain on
which history’s participants struggle over the right for representation.
In relation to the dispute about the Holocaust memorial, the Assmanns come to a similar
conclusion to Habermas:
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the land of the perpetrators, for instance, the memorial could possibly be misunderstood,
not as remembering guilt and shame but as honouring and therefore legitimising the sacri-
fice of victims.45 It should not be a matter of simply viewing the past from the vantage point
of the victims, or of identifying with the victims, if this means that Germans then forget that
most of their forebears were on the side of the perpetrators. What is needed, in Habermas’s
view, is a form of commemoration that involves a type of ‘self-critical crossing of borders’.
This is one that allows the public gaze to settle on the ‘victims whom the sins and omissions
of one’s parents and grandparents made into outsiders, excluded as enemies, humiliated as
humans who were no longer considered human, violated and destroyed’. What is required
is a double perspective, or a ‘decentred form of collective self-understanding that incor-
porates the injured other’ in a way that does not try to paper over the fissures and discon-
tinuities in national history. The Holocaust should not become the new foundational myth
of the Berlin Republic, nor should it be functionalised in the services of a particularist ‘we’.
Too great a concentration on the deed and the perpetrators to the exclusion of the victims
could, he argues, easily prevent sympathy with the victims, while too great a focus on the
victims could result in an instrumentalised view of the victims’ sufferings. The Holocaust
can only cease to be a stumbling block on Germany’s chosen road to normality if the memo-
rial becomes an ‘expression of a civil mark of respect for the descendents of the victims’ and
if Germans accept the Holocaust as a rupture in the continuity of their country’s traditions.
The single most important condition for restoring Germans’ sense of pride and faith in
their traditions must be an acknowledgment of the Holocaust as a radical ‘break in/
with civilisation’.46
Among the participants in the debates about the Holocaust memorial there was little agree-
ment that a monument was the most appropriate means of representing this ‘break in/with
civilisation’. But as Habermas himself argued, other memory sites such as concentration
camps and museums are not an alternative to a monument: ‘Only a monument (Denkmal)
can testify to the will and the message of its proponents’. This can best be served by artistic
means, he contends. Just what type of art was needed to do justice to the project was,
however, yet another contested point. The polarisation of the debate into those in favour
of authentic sites and those advocating aestheticised forms of memory did not help to ade-
quately highlight the differences between these quite distinct forms of remembrance. The
task of educating the population and informing future generations will perhaps always be
served best by the ‘authentic places of horror’. A memorial, for instance, cannot document
the lives of the victims who died in the Holocaust as can the archive currently being com-
piled by Steven Spielberg’s Shoah Foundation. But a memorial can be witness to the ‘will
to remember’ and it can encourage remembrance and contemplation of the event in other
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impassioned keeper of the Holy Grail of the heart. He spoke of the longing to see Germany
unified when it was unfashionable to mention the ‘German question’, admitted to having a
‘feeling for history’ and being obsessed by his ‘Stuttgart-Leipzig-feeling’, and talked openly
of the loss of East Germany in terms of a phantom pain.16 His emotional outbursts over
the years have invariably touched raw nerves, increasingly among members of his own
political camp, who now see in him a renegade. Nonetheless, his speeches have come to
serve much like a type of seismograph that records and relays shifts in the ‘political uncon-
scious’ of the nation.17
It is no accident that Walser’s seemingly unpolitical demand for private recollection of the
war came at a time when Germany appeared to be displaying what Thomas Assheuer has
called an almost ‘obsessive desire for normality’.18 Since the historians’ debate, ‘normali-
sation’ has generally connoted efforts by conservative historians to ‘relativise’ the Nazi past
and the crimes of Auschwitz. For Habermas, speaking in 1992, talk of German ‘normality’
is fraught with dangers because it runs the risk of propagating a ‘second existential lie …
that we have become normal again’.19 Habermas makes a distinction between ‘normativity’,
which is a categorical norm of Western democracies, and ‘normality’, which he sees as a
deformation of the democratic ideal of normativity.
Since German unification, however, ‘normalisation’ is no longer automatically equated
with historical revisionism. It has become an explicit aim of successive German governments
and chancellors, most recently Gerhard Schröder, who declared in 1998 that Germany is
now a normal state with similar values to its neighbours in Europe.20 The Walser–Bubis
debate indicates, however, that the road to normality is by no means paved with gold,
Deutschmarks or even Euros. What the debate has shown is that the National Socialist
past and the Holocaust still represent the main stumbling blocks on the road to building
national identity and achieving self-understanding.
More broadly then, the Walser–Bubis debate raises questions as to whether remembrance
of the Holocaust and the memories of its victims can be reconciled with competing memory
claims of, say, ordinary Germans like Walser and of the perpetrators, and if so how. Can col-
lective memory in Germany accommodate the memories of the perpetrators alongside memo-
ries of the victims without negating or obscuring the suffering of victims of Nazi policies on
race, ethnicity and difference? Is there such a thing as an overarching national story in
Germany today and a collective memory of the Nazi past, or are there ever only individual,
localised memories?21 And finally, what does the presence of a dominant perpetrator nar-
rative and ‘perpetrator trauma’ mean for individuals whose memories and stories deviate
from public memory or who feel that they are excluded from the dominant story?22
The debate has highlighted the enormous difficulties in fashioning a coherent narrative
of national identity that can include the ordinary experiences of ordinary Germans like Walser
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of Eisenman to modify his proposal yet again to include a museum, centre for research, ‘Wall
of Books’ (housing a library) and a ‘Garden of Contemplation’. As laudable as Naumann’s
enthusiasm was, the new proposal required a budget some five or six times greater than
originally planned. Not surprisingly, he was accused of muddying the waters by coming
up with an unworkable alternative. Ignaz Bubis even went as far as to accuse Naumann of
not wanting to build the memorial at all. Meanwhile, many in the other parties, as well as
the SPD, now declared they were in favour of the original Eisenman model, that is, the scaled-
down Eisenman II. While Naumann’s intervention was designed to save the new govern-
ment from international embarrassment, the prolonged debates and uncertainty did not help
Germany’s reputation abroad. The decision to make the final outcome dependent on a
vote in the Bundestag may have been the government’s salvation. On 25 July 1999 the parlia-
ment voted overwhelmingly in favour of building Eisenman II plus an information pavilion—
a memorial with brief ‘user instructions’, as it was commonly referred to.
In his address to the Bundestag, the president of the lower house, Wolfgang Thierse,
reiterated the centrality of the memorial for German identity and for the image of the Berlin
Republic. As a founding act of the newly elected government, the vote of the German parlia-
ment was intended to send an unambiguous signal to the international community, as well
as to future generations about how it plans to position itself in relation to the most shame-
ful chapter of its history. The debate has, however, left many questions unanswered. It is
unclear what effect collective sites of remembrance of such a monumental scale will have on
personalised acts of memory. Will the monument encourage memory and remorse, or will
it facilitate a form of collective catharsis? No-one can predict what use future generations
may find for the monument or how it will be understood. Even a memorial with ‘user instruc-
tions’ will not guarantee how future generations view the Holocaust and utilise the space.
Nor will a memorial necessarily guarantee the centrality of the Holocaust in the nation’s story
in the future.
As Habermas has pointed out, the question of ‘for whom’ the memorial should be built
has not been properly debated or understood. It would be a gross misunderstanding of the
project if Germans thought they were building a memorial for the Jews of Europe. The memo-
rial should be for Germans: ‘with a memorial for the murdered Jews we can attempt to assuage
our conscience’, he argued in 1999.44 Germans should build a memorial to the victims of
German history while not forgetting that Germans today are the direct descendents of the
murderous regime that claimed the lives of millions of Jews, homosexuals, gypsies and politi-
cal opponents of the Nazi regime. Because of the change in perspective that this view of his-
tory entails, since German history is seen from the perspective of the victims, Habermas
warns of the dangers of wanting to build a memorial for the victims of German history. In
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alongside the extraordinary experiences of ordinary Jewish-Germans like Bubis. It raises,
moreover, the question of how competing recollections and experiences of the Nazi past can
be represented in national history, particularly where the memory of one event is per-
ceived as the forgetting of another. The root of Walser’s problem with the Holocaust is that
he sees the commemoration of its victims as a threat to the validity of his story—as if the
Holocaust story in some way interfered with the telling of his own memories, as if it were a
threatening or hostile narrative. It is as if the story of the Holocaust corrupts the innocence
of his childhood and renders it now sinister and impossible to remember.
As Germany’s foremost memory scholars Aleida and Jan Assmann point out, the Holo-
caust can be a central pillar in German memory without this central status meaning a total
or exclusive focus on the Holocaust. In their response to Walser’s outburst, they point to
three levels of memory that co-exist in a nation’s history at any one time: the political-symbolic
dimension of public rituals of memory, which necessarily has a symbolic, ritualised and even
instrumentalised aspect to it; the social level of collective consciousness, which needs, in
their view and that of others, the Holocaust as a negative yardstick against which to measure
the achievements of post-Holocaust civil society; and the personal, which is the sort of mem-
ory that Walser is concerned with. As Klaus Neumann argues, collective discourses about
the past are always shaped by individual acts of remembrance, and he is at pains to empha-
sise the role that individuals and their investments in the past can play in shaping public
memory.23 While each society must give space to what the Assmanns call an ‘individual
coming closer to the many, many dead’, individualised acts of memory cannot be left up to
the individual conscience alone. Especially for the generation that has no first-hand experi-
ence of crimes and genocide, neither public nor personal memory is adequately served by
relegating the past to a matter of personal conscience. For the generations who have no
experience of the Holocaust, the Holocaust is not a matter of conscience but a question of
memory, and how this memory is to be transmitted and represented to future generations
who will also have no first-hand knowledge of it.
In the late 1990s Walser was not alone in his plea for a sense of national belonging that
could take justifiable pride in Germany’s achievements. His remarks on the Holocaust memo-
rial came at a time when politicians on the Left were also revisiting the Left-liberal consen-
sus on memory. By the end of the 1990s there was a discernible shift on the left side of
German politics as a new generation came to power that had no first-hand experience of the
war.24 Again it was remembrance of the Holocaust that presented the greatest obstacle to
forging more positive symbols of national belonging. This time, however, the Holocaust was
to be the central focus of a German memorial in the centre of Berlin to commemorate the
crimes of National Socialism.
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memorial is supposed to act at once as a public and official reminder of Germany’s instiga-
tion of the greatest crimes in modern history, while also cementing a historical self-under-
standing that promotes the formation of a positive national identity’.42
Prior to the 1998 election, the SPD chancellor candidate, Gerhard Schröder, and his
advisor-to-be on cultural affairs, Michael Naumann, expressed their aversion to the memo-
rial proposal. In the first week of the election campaign, Naumann emphatically rejected the
idea of a memorial, as well as the winning model of the second competition by American
architect Peter Eisenman. He saw no need for a memorial when there were other more ‘authen-
tic’ sites of memory, such as Bergen-Belsen. Furthermore, he called the Eisenman’s design
monumental in size and scale and likened it to Albert Speer’s Nazi architecture. The original
plan designed by Eisenman and Sierra (who withdrew his support in 1999) was to build
an undulating seascape of four thousand stone pillars of up to nine metres high. The ‘field
of graves’ was designed to fill a large block of land (the size of two football fields) to the south
of Potsdamer Platz and the Brandenburg Gate, once the site of the Ministerial Gardens
during the Third Reich. Eisenman modified the size of the pillars in a subsequent model,
which became known as Eisenman II.
Gerhard Schröder also distanced himself from Eisenman’s model, which was not altogether
surprising given that it was the model preferred by Kohl’s Christian Democratic government.
He explained that he had ‘certain difficulties accepting that Eisenman’s design was suitable
and appropriate as a symbolic sign at that site’. He too expressed his preference for more
‘authentic’ sites of remembrance, for creating sites of memory in the places where the ‘horror
had taken place’ (an den Orten des Grauens). He saw little point in constructing a monument
that turned memory into an obligatory exercise or a ritualised school excursion. In an unfor-
tunate turn of phrase, he declared in a television discussion that he wanted school children
to want to visit the site. Germans of his generation and those ‘who have no memory of the
events’ ‘should be able to walk around without guilt complexes’, he added.43
By this stage of the debate Schröder was by no means alone in his reluctance to back the
memorial. Early in 1998, eighteen prominent Left-liberal intellectuals, journalists and writers
wrote an open letter to Kohl expressing their concerns about the proposed memorial. By this
time the campaign had also found a more likely opponent—at least according to the wisdom
of Herf’s mental map—in the Christian Democratic mayor of Berlin, Eberhard Diepgen. Berlin
was in danger of becoming ‘the capital city of remorse’, he argued, of shouldering ‘the
main burden of German history with all its dark sides’.
By Christmas 1998, the coordinates of memorial politics, which had seemed to be inverted
during the previous year, gradually started to right themselves. Naumann became a passionate
advocate of a new design, which became known as Eisenman III. He gained the agreement
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Jeffrey Herf recently remarked that American observers of Germany since 1945 frequently
have a mental map in their heads that sets out clearly the relationship between politics and
memory. The mental map neatly divides into Left and Right. On the Right side of the map
are conservative politicians from Adenauer to Kohl, who have pursued ‘policies of silence,
judicial delay and erroneous comparisons’ in relation to the Nazi past.25 On the Left are mem-
bers of the SPD from Kurt Schuhmacher to Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, who saw
memory as essential to rebuilding trust, to improving Germany’s relations with Eastern Europe
and to strengthening democracy.26 The generation of 1968, so the story goes, put the
Holocaust and the fascist past firmly back on the agenda, arguing that democracy needed
‘more memory and more justice’ with regard to the crimes of the Nazi past.27 They challenged
the complacency of their parents’ generation, lobbied to bring the criminals to justice and
called for an uncompromising reckoning with the legacy of the Nazi era. They took the busi-
ness of memory or what the Germans call ‘mastering the past’ (Vergangenheitsbewältigung)
seriously, rather than attempting to draw a ‘line under the past’ (Schlussstrich).
In the run-up to the German Bundestag elections in October 1998, an outsider observer
with this mental map in her head would have become hopelessly confused. It was not the
conservatives but the generation of ’68 that appeared to be advocating drawing a line under
the past. Especially disorienting was the fact that conservative politicians such as Helmut
Kohl were now in favour of memorialising the victims of the Holocaust. Somewhere in the
middle of the 1990s Herf’s mental map had become skewed. The question was would it right
itself or was the map now an obsolete way of conceptualising memorial politics in Germany?
Helmut Kohl had first lent his support to the proposal to erect a memorial in 1992. In
1995 he deemed the issue sufficiently important to intervene in the selection process, rejecting
the winning entry in this first competition. The memorial was initially the idea of journalist
and television celebrity Leo Rosh and historian Eberhard Jaeckel. Rosh announced in 1988,
after a visit to the Israel national memorial in Yad Vashem, that there ought to be a Holocaust
memorial in the land of the perpetrators. The suggestion became the subject of ten years
of heated debate, which saw the setting up of a sponsorship group, a scouting commis-
sion, an adjudication commission, several parliamentary committees and two selection juries.
Two international design competitions were conducted to find a winner: the first in 1994,
the second in 1997. In 1997 a three-day public colloquium was organised by the Berlin
Senate, with the participation of historians, architects, artists, politicians and intellectuals
to further debate the key issues.
In 1995 Kohl declared Christine Jackob-Marks’s winning entry unsuitable. It was for an
eleven-metre high, 20,000-metre square, sloping gravestone. Far from withdrawing his
support, Kohl affected a complete volte-face and encouraged the Bundestag to become more
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group of victims.34 Bubis made a strong case for commemorating the Jewish victims in
isolation from other victims on the grounds that the mass murder of the Jews constitutes a
crime sui generis, a point reiterated in the accompanying documentation of the second com-
petition.35 The text accompanying the second competition also seeks to justify erecting a
memorial exclusively to the Jews on the grounds of their extraordinary contribution to German
culture. The mass murder, it contends, did not merely annihilate approximately six million
Jews, it ‘tore a 1000-year-old culture from the heart of Europe’, the loss of which was also to
be mourned.36 But as Henryk M. Broder was to point out, the reference to the Jewish con-
tribution to German culture only exacerbated the uneasy feeling that many had that the
memorial was quantifying degrees of victimhood. The implication was that ‘the Jews had
made valuable contributions to German culture, had enriched Germany as a cultural nation
from Heinrich Heine to Albert Einstein while the gypsies had at best a few jolly fiddlers to
show for themselves’.37
The issue of which victims were to be honoured was never adequately debated or resolved.
There are obvious dangers in attempting to remember all the victims at one site, which
inevitably raises the question as to whether ordinary soldiers are to be remembered at the
site as well. Nevertheless Kohl’s decision to exclude other victims was generally seen as prob-
lematic. He had acted as an arbiter between competing claims to memory, drawing distinc-
tions between greater and lesser claims, between worthier and less worthy victims, and effec-
tively set up a ‘memorial hierarchy’.38 While many people welcomed Kohl’s intervention
because it involved the city of Berlin and the federal government in the competition, it was
read by some commentators as an opportunistic attempt to rectify his earlier mistakes.39
In the pre-election phase of 1998 the proposed Holocaust memorial inevitably became
embroiled in the political debates of the major parties. Kohl’s decision to defer finalising the
plans for the memorial until after the election failed to avoid the politicisation of the mat-
ter throughout the campaign.40 In the lead up to the elections, questions were raised by
the German Left as to whether the proposed memorial in the heart of Berlin was an appro-
priate signal to send the world on the eve of the Berlin Republic. It looked as if the Left
had undergone a metamorphosis that was almost as mysterious and troubling as that which
afflicted Gregor Samsa. Was the SPD about to awaken from the slumber of opposition and
metamorphose into a party that no longer saw memory of the Holocaust as a ‘critical thorn
in the side of German self-consciousness’ but as a ‘self-conscious staging of its growing power’,
as critic and political commentator Richard Herzinger suggested?41 Would the new party
emerge from its cocoon and let bygones be bygones? Would the ‘cashmir’ Chancellor Schröder
break with the traditions of his SPD forebears and find the memory of the Holocaust incom-
patible with the self-image of an outwardly self-confident nation? The proposal to erect a
memorial was, after all, premised on a paradox, as Caroline Wiedmer points out: ‘The
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closely involved in the selection process of a second competition. By 1998 he met with com-
petitors and appeared determined to achieve a broad consensus for the memorial right up
until the elections.28 Kohl was anxious to avoid the international embarrassment caused
by the Bitburg incident of the mid-1980s when he invited president Ronald Reagan to lay
a wreath in honour of German war veterans at a military cemetery in Bitburg, which also
housed graves of SS members. With the Bitburg incident, Kohl had engineered, according
to Herf, ‘yet another of the zero-sum games of recognition in the history of divided memory
which pitted “Jewish” against “German” suffering’.29 Keen to reverse some of the damage
done by this incident, and with the upsurge of xenophobia after unification, Kohl came under
pressure to improve his record in relation to memory of the National Socialist past.30
The Holocaust memorial afforded Kohl an ideal opportunity, at an opportune moment in
the history of the newly unified nation, to make a memorable symbolic gesture. By promising
Rosh’s group a Holocaust memorial to the Jews, Kohl could prove to the international as well
as national community that he was capable of responding sensitively to the claims of mem-
ory, especially to the memories of Holocaust victims. It is certainly one of the ironies of
German politics that Kohl, whose record in relation to memory of the Nazi past and the Stasi
past had been severely blemished on several occasions,31 should place such key importance
on building the Holocaust memorial.
The proposal to erect a memorial to Jewish victims of the Holocaust represented the most
controversial aspect of the plan. The idea of a memorial honouring the memory of one group
of victims met with vehement protests from Germany’s Sinti and Roma community. Romani
Rose, chairman of the Central Committee for German Sinti and Roma, claimed that Rosh’s
idea represented the ‘establishment of a hierarchy of victims’ creating ‘first- and second-class
genocide victims’.32 The singling out of the Jews for special treatment was reminiscent of the
sort of arbitrary selection processes used by the Nazis. In another attack, Rose accused Ignaz
Bubis of apartheid. Other groups too argued that it was inappropriate to erect a memorial to
only one group of victims of the policies that emanated from the Gestapo headquarters. There
were obviously other victims that needed to be remembered, such as homosexuals, Sinti and
Roma, Slavs, Jehovah Witnesses, the victims of euthanasia, babies of forced labourers, and
physically and mentally handicapped children. The notion that the ‘Final Solution’ was
specifically directed at the Jews inscribed an intentional view of history that blamed the Holo-
caust on the will and intentions of Hitler.33
The matter was resolved, albeit unsatisfactorily, in November 1989 when Leo Rosh and
her supporters formed a group calling itself the Sponsorship Group for the Erection of a
Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe, which specifically made mention only of the
Jewish victims of the Holocaust. When Kohl’s government supported the group in 1992,
pledging federal funds for the project, it lent tacit support to the proposal to single out one
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group of victims.34 Bubis made a strong case for commemorating the Jewish victims in
isolation from other victims on the grounds that the mass murder of the Jews constitutes a
crime sui generis, a point reiterated in the accompanying documentation of the second com-
petition.35 The text accompanying the second competition also seeks to justify erecting a
memorial exclusively to the Jews on the grounds of their extraordinary contribution to German
culture. The mass murder, it contends, did not merely annihilate approximately six million
Jews, it ‘tore a 1000-year-old culture from the heart of Europe’, the loss of which was also to
be mourned.36 But as Henryk M. Broder was to point out, the reference to the Jewish con-
tribution to German culture only exacerbated the uneasy feeling that many had that the
memorial was quantifying degrees of victimhood. The implication was that ‘the Jews had
made valuable contributions to German culture, had enriched Germany as a cultural nation
from Heinrich Heine to Albert Einstein while the gypsies had at best a few jolly fiddlers to
show for themselves’.37
The issue of which victims were to be honoured was never adequately debated or resolved.
There are obvious dangers in attempting to remember all the victims at one site, which
inevitably raises the question as to whether ordinary soldiers are to be remembered at the
site as well. Nevertheless Kohl’s decision to exclude other victims was generally seen as prob-
lematic. He had acted as an arbiter between competing claims to memory, drawing distinc-
tions between greater and lesser claims, between worthier and less worthy victims, and effec-
tively set up a ‘memorial hierarchy’.38 While many people welcomed Kohl’s intervention
because it involved the city of Berlin and the federal government in the competition, it was
read by some commentators as an opportunistic attempt to rectify his earlier mistakes.39
In the pre-election phase of 1998 the proposed Holocaust memorial inevitably became
embroiled in the political debates of the major parties. Kohl’s decision to defer finalising the
plans for the memorial until after the election failed to avoid the politicisation of the mat-
ter throughout the campaign.40 In the lead up to the elections, questions were raised by
the German Left as to whether the proposed memorial in the heart of Berlin was an appro-
priate signal to send the world on the eve of the Berlin Republic. It looked as if the Left
had undergone a metamorphosis that was almost as mysterious and troubling as that which
afflicted Gregor Samsa. Was the SPD about to awaken from the slumber of opposition and
metamorphose into a party that no longer saw memory of the Holocaust as a ‘critical thorn
in the side of German self-consciousness’ but as a ‘self-conscious staging of its growing power’,
as critic and political commentator Richard Herzinger suggested?41 Would the new party
emerge from its cocoon and let bygones be bygones? Would the ‘cashmir’ Chancellor Schröder
break with the traditions of his SPD forebears and find the memory of the Holocaust incom-
patible with the self-image of an outwardly self-confident nation? The proposal to erect a
memorial was, after all, premised on a paradox, as Caroline Wiedmer points out: ‘The
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closely involved in the selection process of a second competition. By 1998 he met with com-
petitors and appeared determined to achieve a broad consensus for the memorial right up
until the elections.28 Kohl was anxious to avoid the international embarrassment caused
by the Bitburg incident of the mid-1980s when he invited president Ronald Reagan to lay
a wreath in honour of German war veterans at a military cemetery in Bitburg, which also
housed graves of SS members. With the Bitburg incident, Kohl had engineered, according
to Herf, ‘yet another of the zero-sum games of recognition in the history of divided memory
which pitted “Jewish” against “German” suffering’.29 Keen to reverse some of the damage
done by this incident, and with the upsurge of xenophobia after unification, Kohl came under
pressure to improve his record in relation to memory of the National Socialist past.30
The Holocaust memorial afforded Kohl an ideal opportunity, at an opportune moment in
the history of the newly unified nation, to make a memorable symbolic gesture. By promising
Rosh’s group a Holocaust memorial to the Jews, Kohl could prove to the international as well
as national community that he was capable of responding sensitively to the claims of mem-
ory, especially to the memories of Holocaust victims. It is certainly one of the ironies of
German politics that Kohl, whose record in relation to memory of the Nazi past and the Stasi
past had been severely blemished on several occasions,31 should place such key importance
on building the Holocaust memorial.
The proposal to erect a memorial to Jewish victims of the Holocaust represented the most
controversial aspect of the plan. The idea of a memorial honouring the memory of one group
of victims met with vehement protests from Germany’s Sinti and Roma community. Romani
Rose, chairman of the Central Committee for German Sinti and Roma, claimed that Rosh’s
idea represented the ‘establishment of a hierarchy of victims’ creating ‘first- and second-class
genocide victims’.32 The singling out of the Jews for special treatment was reminiscent of the
sort of arbitrary selection processes used by the Nazis. In another attack, Rose accused Ignaz
Bubis of apartheid. Other groups too argued that it was inappropriate to erect a memorial to
only one group of victims of the policies that emanated from the Gestapo headquarters. There
were obviously other victims that needed to be remembered, such as homosexuals, Sinti and
Roma, Slavs, Jehovah Witnesses, the victims of euthanasia, babies of forced labourers, and
physically and mentally handicapped children. The notion that the ‘Final Solution’ was
specifically directed at the Jews inscribed an intentional view of history that blamed the Holo-
caust on the will and intentions of Hitler.33
The matter was resolved, albeit unsatisfactorily, in November 1989 when Leo Rosh and
her supporters formed a group calling itself the Sponsorship Group for the Erection of a
Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe, which specifically made mention only of the
Jewish victims of the Holocaust. When Kohl’s government supported the group in 1992,
pledging federal funds for the project, it lent tacit support to the proposal to single out one
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memorial is supposed to act at once as a public and official reminder of Germany’s instiga-
tion of the greatest crimes in modern history, while also cementing a historical self-under-
standing that promotes the formation of a positive national identity’.42
Prior to the 1998 election, the SPD chancellor candidate, Gerhard Schröder, and his
advisor-to-be on cultural affairs, Michael Naumann, expressed their aversion to the memo-
rial proposal. In the first week of the election campaign, Naumann emphatically rejected the
idea of a memorial, as well as the winning model of the second competition by American
architect Peter Eisenman. He saw no need for a memorial when there were other more ‘authen-
tic’ sites of memory, such as Bergen-Belsen. Furthermore, he called the Eisenman’s design
monumental in size and scale and likened it to Albert Speer’s Nazi architecture. The original
plan designed by Eisenman and Sierra (who withdrew his support in 1999) was to build
an undulating seascape of four thousand stone pillars of up to nine metres high. The ‘field
of graves’ was designed to fill a large block of land (the size of two football fields) to the south
of Potsdamer Platz and the Brandenburg Gate, once the site of the Ministerial Gardens
during the Third Reich. Eisenman modified the size of the pillars in a subsequent model,
which became known as Eisenman II.
Gerhard Schröder also distanced himself from Eisenman’s model, which was not altogether
surprising given that it was the model preferred by Kohl’s Christian Democratic government.
He explained that he had ‘certain difficulties accepting that Eisenman’s design was suitable
and appropriate as a symbolic sign at that site’. He too expressed his preference for more
‘authentic’ sites of remembrance, for creating sites of memory in the places where the ‘horror
had taken place’ (an den Orten des Grauens). He saw little point in constructing a monument
that turned memory into an obligatory exercise or a ritualised school excursion. In an unfor-
tunate turn of phrase, he declared in a television discussion that he wanted school children
to want to visit the site. Germans of his generation and those ‘who have no memory of the
events’ ‘should be able to walk around without guilt complexes’, he added.43
By this stage of the debate Schröder was by no means alone in his reluctance to back the
memorial. Early in 1998, eighteen prominent Left-liberal intellectuals, journalists and writers
wrote an open letter to Kohl expressing their concerns about the proposed memorial. By this
time the campaign had also found a more likely opponent—at least according to the wisdom
of Herf’s mental map—in the Christian Democratic mayor of Berlin, Eberhard Diepgen. Berlin
was in danger of becoming ‘the capital city of remorse’, he argued, of shouldering ‘the
main burden of German history with all its dark sides’.
By Christmas 1998, the coordinates of memorial politics, which had seemed to be inverted
during the previous year, gradually started to right themselves. Naumann became a passionate
advocate of a new design, which became known as Eisenman III. He gained the agreement
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Jeffrey Herf recently remarked that American observers of Germany since 1945 frequently
have a mental map in their heads that sets out clearly the relationship between politics and
memory. The mental map neatly divides into Left and Right. On the Right side of the map
are conservative politicians from Adenauer to Kohl, who have pursued ‘policies of silence,
judicial delay and erroneous comparisons’ in relation to the Nazi past.25 On the Left are mem-
bers of the SPD from Kurt Schuhmacher to Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, who saw
memory as essential to rebuilding trust, to improving Germany’s relations with Eastern Europe
and to strengthening democracy.26 The generation of 1968, so the story goes, put the
Holocaust and the fascist past firmly back on the agenda, arguing that democracy needed
‘more memory and more justice’ with regard to the crimes of the Nazi past.27 They challenged
the complacency of their parents’ generation, lobbied to bring the criminals to justice and
called for an uncompromising reckoning with the legacy of the Nazi era. They took the busi-
ness of memory or what the Germans call ‘mastering the past’ (Vergangenheitsbewältigung)
seriously, rather than attempting to draw a ‘line under the past’ (Schlussstrich).
In the run-up to the German Bundestag elections in October 1998, an outsider observer
with this mental map in her head would have become hopelessly confused. It was not the
conservatives but the generation of ’68 that appeared to be advocating drawing a line under
the past. Especially disorienting was the fact that conservative politicians such as Helmut
Kohl were now in favour of memorialising the victims of the Holocaust. Somewhere in the
middle of the 1990s Herf’s mental map had become skewed. The question was would it right
itself or was the map now an obsolete way of conceptualising memorial politics in Germany?
Helmut Kohl had first lent his support to the proposal to erect a memorial in 1992. In
1995 he deemed the issue sufficiently important to intervene in the selection process, rejecting
the winning entry in this first competition. The memorial was initially the idea of journalist
and television celebrity Leo Rosh and historian Eberhard Jaeckel. Rosh announced in 1988,
after a visit to the Israel national memorial in Yad Vashem, that there ought to be a Holocaust
memorial in the land of the perpetrators. The suggestion became the subject of ten years
of heated debate, which saw the setting up of a sponsorship group, a scouting commis-
sion, an adjudication commission, several parliamentary committees and two selection juries.
Two international design competitions were conducted to find a winner: the first in 1994,
the second in 1997. In 1997 a three-day public colloquium was organised by the Berlin
Senate, with the participation of historians, architects, artists, politicians and intellectuals
to further debate the key issues.
In 1995 Kohl declared Christine Jackob-Marks’s winning entry unsuitable. It was for an
eleven-metre high, 20,000-metre square, sloping gravestone. Far from withdrawing his
support, Kohl affected a complete volte-face and encouraged the Bundestag to become more
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of Eisenman to modify his proposal yet again to include a museum, centre for research, ‘Wall
of Books’ (housing a library) and a ‘Garden of Contemplation’. As laudable as Naumann’s
enthusiasm was, the new proposal required a budget some five or six times greater than
originally planned. Not surprisingly, he was accused of muddying the waters by coming
up with an unworkable alternative. Ignaz Bubis even went as far as to accuse Naumann of
not wanting to build the memorial at all. Meanwhile, many in the other parties, as well as
the SPD, now declared they were in favour of the original Eisenman model, that is, the scaled-
down Eisenman II. While Naumann’s intervention was designed to save the new govern-
ment from international embarrassment, the prolonged debates and uncertainty did not help
Germany’s reputation abroad. The decision to make the final outcome dependent on a
vote in the Bundestag may have been the government’s salvation. On 25 July 1999 the parlia-
ment voted overwhelmingly in favour of building Eisenman II plus an information pavilion—
a memorial with brief ‘user instructions’, as it was commonly referred to.
In his address to the Bundestag, the president of the lower house, Wolfgang Thierse,
reiterated the centrality of the memorial for German identity and for the image of the Berlin
Republic. As a founding act of the newly elected government, the vote of the German parlia-
ment was intended to send an unambiguous signal to the international community, as well
as to future generations about how it plans to position itself in relation to the most shame-
ful chapter of its history. The debate has, however, left many questions unanswered. It is
unclear what effect collective sites of remembrance of such a monumental scale will have on
personalised acts of memory. Will the monument encourage memory and remorse, or will
it facilitate a form of collective catharsis? No-one can predict what use future generations
may find for the monument or how it will be understood. Even a memorial with ‘user instruc-
tions’ will not guarantee how future generations view the Holocaust and utilise the space.
Nor will a memorial necessarily guarantee the centrality of the Holocaust in the nation’s story
in the future.
As Habermas has pointed out, the question of ‘for whom’ the memorial should be built
has not been properly debated or understood. It would be a gross misunderstanding of the
project if Germans thought they were building a memorial for the Jews of Europe. The memo-
rial should be for Germans: ‘with a memorial for the murdered Jews we can attempt to assuage
our conscience’, he argued in 1999.44 Germans should build a memorial to the victims of
German history while not forgetting that Germans today are the direct descendents of the
murderous regime that claimed the lives of millions of Jews, homosexuals, gypsies and politi-
cal opponents of the Nazi regime. Because of the change in perspective that this view of his-
tory entails, since German history is seen from the perspective of the victims, Habermas
warns of the dangers of wanting to build a memorial for the victims of German history. In
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alongside the extraordinary experiences of ordinary Jewish-Germans like Bubis. It raises,
moreover, the question of how competing recollections and experiences of the Nazi past can
be represented in national history, particularly where the memory of one event is per-
ceived as the forgetting of another. The root of Walser’s problem with the Holocaust is that
he sees the commemoration of its victims as a threat to the validity of his story—as if the
Holocaust story in some way interfered with the telling of his own memories, as if it were a
threatening or hostile narrative. It is as if the story of the Holocaust corrupts the innocence
of his childhood and renders it now sinister and impossible to remember.
As Germany’s foremost memory scholars Aleida and Jan Assmann point out, the Holo-
caust can be a central pillar in German memory without this central status meaning a total
or exclusive focus on the Holocaust. In their response to Walser’s outburst, they point to
three levels of memory that co-exist in a nation’s history at any one time: the political-symbolic
dimension of public rituals of memory, which necessarily has a symbolic, ritualised and even
instrumentalised aspect to it; the social level of collective consciousness, which needs, in
their view and that of others, the Holocaust as a negative yardstick against which to measure
the achievements of post-Holocaust civil society; and the personal, which is the sort of mem-
ory that Walser is concerned with. As Klaus Neumann argues, collective discourses about
the past are always shaped by individual acts of remembrance, and he is at pains to empha-
sise the role that individuals and their investments in the past can play in shaping public
memory.23 While each society must give space to what the Assmanns call an ‘individual
coming closer to the many, many dead’, individualised acts of memory cannot be left up to
the individual conscience alone. Especially for the generation that has no first-hand experi-
ence of crimes and genocide, neither public nor personal memory is adequately served by
relegating the past to a matter of personal conscience. For the generations who have no
experience of the Holocaust, the Holocaust is not a matter of conscience but a question of
memory, and how this memory is to be transmitted and represented to future generations
who will also have no first-hand knowledge of it.
In the late 1990s Walser was not alone in his plea for a sense of national belonging that
could take justifiable pride in Germany’s achievements. His remarks on the Holocaust memo-
rial came at a time when politicians on the Left were also revisiting the Left-liberal consen-
sus on memory. By the end of the 1990s there was a discernible shift on the left side of
German politics as a new generation came to power that had no first-hand experience of the
war.24 Again it was remembrance of the Holocaust that presented the greatest obstacle to
forging more positive symbols of national belonging. This time, however, the Holocaust was
to be the central focus of a German memorial in the centre of Berlin to commemorate the
crimes of National Socialism.
116 VOLUME9 NUMBER2 NOV2003
the land of the perpetrators, for instance, the memorial could possibly be misunderstood,
not as remembering guilt and shame but as honouring and therefore legitimising the sacri-
fice of victims.45 It should not be a matter of simply viewing the past from the vantage point
of the victims, or of identifying with the victims, if this means that Germans then forget that
most of their forebears were on the side of the perpetrators. What is needed, in Habermas’s
view, is a form of commemoration that involves a type of ‘self-critical crossing of borders’.
This is one that allows the public gaze to settle on the ‘victims whom the sins and omissions
of one’s parents and grandparents made into outsiders, excluded as enemies, humiliated as
humans who were no longer considered human, violated and destroyed’. What is required
is a double perspective, or a ‘decentred form of collective self-understanding that incor-
porates the injured other’ in a way that does not try to paper over the fissures and discon-
tinuities in national history. The Holocaust should not become the new foundational myth
of the Berlin Republic, nor should it be functionalised in the services of a particularist ‘we’.
Too great a concentration on the deed and the perpetrators to the exclusion of the victims
could, he argues, easily prevent sympathy with the victims, while too great a focus on the
victims could result in an instrumentalised view of the victims’ sufferings. The Holocaust
can only cease to be a stumbling block on Germany’s chosen road to normality if the memo-
rial becomes an ‘expression of a civil mark of respect for the descendents of the victims’ and
if Germans accept the Holocaust as a rupture in the continuity of their country’s traditions.
The single most important condition for restoring Germans’ sense of pride and faith in
their traditions must be an acknowledgment of the Holocaust as a radical ‘break in/
with civilisation’.46
Among the participants in the debates about the Holocaust memorial there was little agree-
ment that a monument was the most appropriate means of representing this ‘break in/with
civilisation’. But as Habermas himself argued, other memory sites such as concentration
camps and museums are not an alternative to a monument: ‘Only a monument (Denkmal)
can testify to the will and the message of its proponents’. This can best be served by artistic
means, he contends. Just what type of art was needed to do justice to the project was,
however, yet another contested point. The polarisation of the debate into those in favour
of authentic sites and those advocating aestheticised forms of memory did not help to ade-
quately highlight the differences between these quite distinct forms of remembrance. The
task of educating the population and informing future generations will perhaps always be
served best by the ‘authentic places of horror’. A memorial, for instance, cannot document
the lives of the victims who died in the Holocaust as can the archive currently being com-
piled by Steven Spielberg’s Shoah Foundation. But a memorial can be witness to the ‘will
to remember’ and it can encourage remembrance and contemplation of the event in other
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impassioned keeper of the Holy Grail of the heart. He spoke of the longing to see Germany
unified when it was unfashionable to mention the ‘German question’, admitted to having a
‘feeling for history’ and being obsessed by his ‘Stuttgart-Leipzig-feeling’, and talked openly
of the loss of East Germany in terms of a phantom pain.16 His emotional outbursts over
the years have invariably touched raw nerves, increasingly among members of his own
political camp, who now see in him a renegade. Nonetheless, his speeches have come to
serve much like a type of seismograph that records and relays shifts in the ‘political uncon-
scious’ of the nation.17
It is no accident that Walser’s seemingly unpolitical demand for private recollection of the
war came at a time when Germany appeared to be displaying what Thomas Assheuer has
called an almost ‘obsessive desire for normality’.18 Since the historians’ debate, ‘normali-
sation’ has generally connoted efforts by conservative historians to ‘relativise’ the Nazi past
and the crimes of Auschwitz. For Habermas, speaking in 1992, talk of German ‘normality’
is fraught with dangers because it runs the risk of propagating a ‘second existential lie …
that we have become normal again’.19 Habermas makes a distinction between ‘normativity’,
which is a categorical norm of Western democracies, and ‘normality’, which he sees as a
deformation of the democratic ideal of normativity.
Since German unification, however, ‘normalisation’ is no longer automatically equated
with historical revisionism. It has become an explicit aim of successive German governments
and chancellors, most recently Gerhard Schröder, who declared in 1998 that Germany is
now a normal state with similar values to its neighbours in Europe.20 The Walser–Bubis
debate indicates, however, that the road to normality is by no means paved with gold,
Deutschmarks or even Euros. What the debate has shown is that the National Socialist
past and the Holocaust still represent the main stumbling blocks on the road to building
national identity and achieving self-understanding.
More broadly then, the Walser–Bubis debate raises questions as to whether remembrance
of the Holocaust and the memories of its victims can be reconciled with competing memory
claims of, say, ordinary Germans like Walser and of the perpetrators, and if so how. Can col-
lective memory in Germany accommodate the memories of the perpetrators alongside memo-
ries of the victims without negating or obscuring the suffering of victims of Nazi policies on
race, ethnicity and difference? Is there such a thing as an overarching national story in
Germany today and a collective memory of the Nazi past, or are there ever only individual,
localised memories?21 And finally, what does the presence of a dominant perpetrator nar-
rative and ‘perpetrator trauma’ mean for individuals whose memories and stories deviate
from public memory or who feel that they are excluded from the dominant story?22
The debate has highlighted the enormous difficulties in fashioning a coherent narrative
of national identity that can include the ordinary experiences of ordinary Germans like Walser
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lament at the perpetual staging of Germany’s disgrace in the media was not aimed at the pre-
ponderance of programs about the Third Reich on television. It is hard to see how the
smattering of documentaries about the war and Jewish life on the French–German cross-
cultural channel ‘arte’ could be seen as intrusive, especially when Walser had thirty other
channels to choose from in the deregulated, privatised world of German television. Or, as
one scathing commentator suggested, had one of his children stolen his remote control?12
Not only Bubis condemned Walser’s plea for remembrance as a form of private confession
and penance. For many observers, the pietistic politics of memory implied by Walser’s inward-
looking form of ‘conscience-gazing’ was only too reminiscent of the fateful stance taken by
some intellectuals who stayed in Germany during the Third Reich. Walser’s distinction
between public and private reminded some of the distinction that Martin Heidegger drew
between private, authentic forms of being and inauthentic (uneigentlich) acts of public
remembrance.13
If memory, like one’s conscience, is a private thing, as Walser would argue, this evades the
real issue at stake in his speech about how nations are to organise their rituals of remem-
brance. Walser rather petulantly refuses to make a distinction between recollection as a
private act and as a collective remembrance, between each individual’s need to make peace
with his or her own sense of guilt and the needs of a collective to commemorate official acts
of heroism and shame. He implies, moreover, that there is complicity between public remem-
brance and forgetting. And more worryingly, he overlooks the need for solidarity with the
victims of history and their right to preserve the memory of their suffering. In a bizarre twist
of history, Walser appropriates the vulnerability of the victims for ‘ordinary’ Germans like
himself. He blames the Holocaust industry for seeking to ‘hurt’ decent conscience-stricken
Germans and for denying Germany the right to normality. Essentially, he tries to argue that
normal Germans can lay claim to victimhood too, and that these ordinary ‘victims’ are the
victims of the ‘Auschwitz moral police’. Where Walser’s outburst differs from other more
recent reflections on the theme of Germans as victims, such as in Günter Grass’s recent novel
Crabwalk,14 is in the way he apportions blame for the omission. Whereas Grass wants to
reproach himself for failing to address the topic of the sufferings of German refugees earlier,
Walser singles out the Holocaust industry.
In many ways the Walser–Bubis debate represents a litmus test of changing levels of
tolerance in the self-understanding of the German nation. It also marks a change in
German–Jewish relations that has been welcomed by some as a more normal form of engage-
ment with the Jewish community in Germany, but condemned by others as an unhealthy
sign of the continuation of the ‘negative symbiosis’ that has characterised German–Jewish
relations since the Enlightenment.15 Over the last two to three decades Walser has made
quite a reputation for himself, not as the ‘moral conscience of the nation’, but more as an
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ways. As Salomon Korn has repeatedly argued, a memorial need not stand in opposition
or even in competition to authentic sites of remembrance; both forms of memory ought to
augment and complement each other.47
Eisenman likes to think of the monument as a place where private and public remem-
brance converge. It employs none of the habitual Holocaust symbolism and does not seek
to represent the Holocaust in personalised, accessible ways, or through recourse to stereo-
typed figures of victims and liberators. The place has no centre, no focus, and there will be
no guided tours available. Each individual must experience it alone, just as each Jew was
subjected to the ‘terror of loneliness’ under the Nazis. From the outside it looks deceptive,
like a field of corn frozen in time. Inside the maze, Eisenman hopes, the memorial will be
unsettling and disorienting, and will thus be able to evoke a little of the experience of the
Jews ‘inside’ the Third Reich.48 Part of the criticism of the model stems from its unconven-
tionality and abstractness, and because it appears to have no content. People often feel safer
with memorial sites that have unambiguous messages and familiar iconography that can
be easily understood. They often feel more at ease with monuments that leave nothing to
chance, even if the messages are constantly rewritten and retold.
The metamorphosis of Germany’s memorial culture into a culture of forgetting did not
eventuate, as many feared, at the time of the Walser–Bubis debate. As Habermas has reasoned,
Germany was able to relieve itself of the ‘indigestion from an undigested past’ thanks to
the intervention of a prominent Jewish businessman in Bubis. Habermas’s point here is that
only through constant and sustained public debate, as the means by which stakeholders
articulate their interests, can the norms of the public sphere be negotiated.
Public debates about the past hold a special significance in the psychic life of the nation
because contested memories of the past are always about the present and the future of the
nation. As Aleida and Jan Assmann argue:
There are private, personal memories … They often stand in opposition to what is being
said in public discourse. On the other hand, we have to realise that memories always have
a function in the public sphere … What is remembered in the present always stands in
relation to this present, one could say: it is always instrumentalised. The remembered past
always serves to legitimate or to delegitimate the present.49
Cultural memory (das kulturelle Gedächtnis) is, according to them, the contested terrain on
which history’s participants struggle over the right for representation.
In relation to the dispute about the Holocaust memorial, the Assmanns come to a similar
conclusion to Habermas:
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murder of the Jews during the Third Reich. Since the Holocaust, the gesture of looking the
other way has become more or less synonymous with moral capitulation.
Walser’s speech was greeted by unanimous applause from all of the invited guests bar one,
the now deceased Ignaz Bubis (1927–99), the chairman of the Committee for Jews in
Germany, who was sitting in the front row. While he refrained from spoiling the occasion,
Bubis was quick to retaliate, accusing Walser later of committing ‘intellectual arson’. In the
weeks that followed, an embittered argument unfolded that was later to be described by
Schirrmacher, somewhat hypocritically since he had been one of the instigators of the feud,
as the ‘most painful’ dispute of the 1990s. Walser was joined by politicians and prominent
intellectuals, who had varying interpretations of Walser’s agenda. Some saw it as a form of
historical revisionism and sympathised with Walser, applauding his courage in voicing his
frustration at the political correctness of the media. Some, like Monika Maron, a dissident
writer from the former East Germany, even praised Walser for attempting to correct a moral
imbalance between Jews and Germans and chastised Walser’s critics for trying to censor him.
Summarising the impact of the debate, Schirrmacher wrote in 1999 that it appeared as if the
major protagonists of the quarrel were taking their leave from the public stage. The con-
troversy was like a last duel ‘that left only injured behind but no victors or vanquished’. 10
Indeed, for one of the participants, it was to be a final public intervention because a year
later Bubis passed away.
To the frustration of his critics, Walser refused to name names and identify specific causes
that had instrumentalised Auschwitz. Was he referring to the compensation claims of the
labourers forced to work in German industry under the Nazis, which were under negotia-
tion at the time, as Bubis had perhaps inferred? Or was Walser alluding to the instrumen-
talisation of Auschwitz in debates about euthanasia and the ethics of biotechnology and stem-
cell research? And who were the elusive ‘opinion soldiers’ who wielded their moral clubs
at the troops of reluctant mourners? Walser was irritatingly vague about what had forced
him to look away time after time. It was only in reference to the planned Berlin memorial to
the murdered Jews in Europe that Walser allowed himself to become concrete. The cementing
of the ‘centre of the capital city’, he claimed, was a ‘nightmare the size of a football field’. The
monument was not merely a prime example of the ‘perpetual presentation of our shame’,
it was ‘a monumentalisation of our shame’. Memory in the public domain, he concluded, had
become an ‘obligatory exercise’, an inauthentic form of penance that had lost its meaning.
Only as a matter of private conscience, in the form of personal recollection, could memories
of the Holocaust be kept alive and protected from the harsh world of politics.
The point about the misuse and instrumentalisation of the Holocaust in political debate
is hardly new, as commentators were quick to point out.11 Surely, his critics asked, Walser’s
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Our generation … grew up with the formula ‘consensus’. In the meantime we have got to
the stage where we can recognise that it is the dispute (Streit) that binds us together. The
pluralisation of positions, even in matters of the right form of memory, is, in itself, nothing
harmful. I regard the potential for contestation that was recently unleashed by Walser as
part and parcel of a functioning democratic disputational culture (Streitkultur).50
Only through an open-ended process of debating and determining normativity, that is,
through the ideal of open and ‘powerfree’ dialogue, which both Habermas and the Assmanns
see as the hallmark of a functioning critical democratic public sphere, can Germany agree
on its norms of public memory.
Pierre Bourdieu has pointed out that cultural disputes are the means by which certain sec-
tions of the political classes seek to assert their dominance, or social capital, over others.
Debates about the Holocaust and its place in public memory are just one of the many and
varied ways by which German intellectuals today seek to validate their ideological and poli-
tical positions through telling their respective versions of the national story. They do so,
according to Bourdieu, in power struggles aimed at the accumulation and assertion of symbolic
capital over competing sections of the intelligentsia. The Walser–Bubis debate represents
one recent attempt by German intellectuals and politicians to reformulate the terms in which
the German national debate about the Holocaust has been cast.
The Walser–Bubis debate eventually proved that the debate was not about relativising the
crimes of the Holocaust or about its singularity in modern history, as was the case with
earlier revisionist debates. The debate was partially about the struggles among Germany’s
intelligentsia over symbolic capital; at its most primitive, it was about Walser versus Grass,
and their respective politics and versions of the past. At its most sophisticated, the debate
was about myths of origins. What Walser appeared to be objecting to were the mono-
dimensional ways in which Germans are generally inscribed into the perpetrator trauma and
primal scene of national identification of the Holocaust. The most charitable interpretation
of Walser’s speech is that he was arguing for greater plurality and inclusivity in the nation-
al story and for greater variation in the perpetrator story, much in the way that the Assmanns
argue. At best, he could then be seen as putting the case for a more truly dialectical approach
to resolving contradictions between personal and public memory, allowing for individual
deviations to the dominant national narrative and for personalised responses to official
versions of the past. Walser’s remarks on the necessity for individualised forms of memory
in the aftermath of his acceptance speech support this:
I will not allow myself to be told how to remember. Perhaps I did not make it clear enough
that [I think] there should be public memory. But how every individual feels and what kind
of conscience he and his family and children should have, that must be left up to him.51
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In the broader context of calls in the 1990s, particularly on the Left, for Germans to redis-
cover national pride and to embrace a more positive sense of national identity, any discussion
of Auschwitz, or the Holocaust, goes to the heart of what it means to be German today. Both
of the debates under discussion here demonstrate the tensions in forging a new, more positive
sense of national identity that does not disavow the legacy of a genocidal past. They thus
reveal the degree to which Germans struggle to attain ‘normality’ in the face of a past that
explodes all myths of positive continuities between past and present. As part of the public
process by which this so-called ‘normality’ is being negotiated today, the debates point to
some of the problems that negative myths of origin have posed for Germans. They highlight
some of the difficulties Germans have had in reconciling desires for ‘normality’ and
‘normalisation’ with a growing acceptance on both sides of politics of the need to respect
and commemorate Holocaust victims’ sufferings.
More generally, these two examples from Germany are instructive beyond the national
context for the way in which they illuminate some of the difficulties that perpetrator nations,
as well as nations with a recent criminal history such as Australia, can have in negotiating
public memorial practices and managing their rituals of remembrance. The challenge facing
the Berlin Republic is one that many nations with a tainted past face, as they seek to recon-
cile the demand for greater ‘normality’ and more positive symbols of national belonging, on
the one hand, with the moral and ethical impulse to keep the memory of a criminal or shame-
ful past alive, on the other. Moreover, the German case study is helpful in an Australian con-
text because it offers insights into some of the difficulties a political generation with no first-
hand experience of past crimes has in dealing with the legacy of this past and in fashioning
its own distinctive culture of memory. Potentially, it also offers a way out of some of the dilem-
mas that successive political generations face when confronted with these questions.
In his acceptance speech, delivered to an audience of prominent members of the com-
munity in the Gothic surrounds of the Paulskirche in Frankfurt, Martin Walser raised the
question of the uses and abuses of the Holocaust in the public arena. According to Walser
‘Auschwitz’ had been turned into ‘moral club’ that was wielded for political purposes.7 It
had been instrumentalised in moral and ethical debates, he argued, trivialised by mass media
representations, by empty ritualised forms of remembrance and insincere acts of lip-service:
‘Everyone knows our historical burden, our everlasting shame,’ and no day passes, Walser
continues, ‘on which we are not reminded of it’.8 Auschwitz was routinely staged as a threat,
with the result that he had been forced to ‘look the other way’. Indeed, he had found him-
self forced to ‘look the other way’ ‘at least twenty times’ or more in the face of the ‘perpetual
presentation of our shame’.9 The charge of looking the other way was, of course, the accusation
levelled at ordinary Germans who turned a blind eye to the deportation, incarceration and
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Walser gives us no indication how personalised acts of remembrance stand in relation to
public acts of memory: whether they are informed by the national template for remembrance
or whether they are intended to challenge its hegemony.
At worst, Walser’s speech can be seen as extreme disingenuousness. He was most certainly
not talking in the Paulskirche in his capacity as a private individual, who finds his own per-
sonal history not adequately reflected in the national story. He was speaking as a public intel-
lectual. As a writer of some considerable reputation and in possession of substantial amounts
of symbolic and cultural capital, Walser was also seeking reassurance on his currency as a
public intellectual. Thus in many ways, his intervention in the Paulskirche was an attempt
to assert his symbolic capital (possibly against other stakeholders in the literary field, such
as Günter Grass) and to shape the direction of national debates about Germany’s past.
Schirrmacher’s role in the debate was to give Walser’s speech a political context and to
recuperate its revisionist tendencies for Schirrmacher’s own conservative agenda. Schirr-
macher instrumentalises Walser’s speech in an effort to pull the terms of the debate about
myths of origins back to the Right. After the regime change in 1998, Schirrmacher may have
had concerns that the Left-liberal consensus on the Holocaust, which had fought for domi-
nance over the previous decades, would be given official legitimacy by the incoming
government. By 1998, the Left-liberal consensus on the Nazi past was already firmly
entrenched such that the only tactic available to Schirrmacher was to argue that ordinary
Germans too were victims of National Socialism. If we accept the view that the centrality
of the Holocaust in public memory in Germany was no longer seriously in dispute in
1998, then Schirrmacher’s strategy after 1998 is not to dispute that the Holocaust happened
or that it was the foundational experience for Germans in the postwar period. Instead, what
he challenges is the content and make-up of the perpetrator trauma. He does so by calling
for the inclusion of the trauma of ordinary Germans into the national phantasm.
Ultimately, the Walser–Bubis debate is less a troublesome sign of a political or anti-Semitic
backlash than evidence of the ‘disputational culture’ (Streitkultur) that has been a domi-
nant feature of postwar Germany. But both debates can be seen as evidence of the process
by which norms about the nation and its memory are disputed and negotiated as Germans
strive to achieve a sense of ‘progressive normality’ and a feeling of equal belonging in the
international community of nations. But however healthy the process may be, there is always
a good deal of fallout from public feuds and interventions such as these, and the loss of faith
among Germany’s Jewish community has been one of the least desirable effects of Walser’s
speech. Moreover, the desired normality of Germany is today still very much in contention,
with many Germans decidedly uncomfortable about what this normality will look like and
whether normality means that Germans will become less inhibited about articulating
latent racism and anti-Semitism. Many American Jews, most notably James E. Young, have
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that was to attract much international attention. Jürgen Habermas described the whole affair
as an embarrassing sign of ‘indigestion from an undigested past which regularly rises from
the belly of the Federal Republic of Germany’.5 An undigested past was, as every German
familiar with the writings of the Frankfurt School philosophers knows, likely to repeat itself
on you; if not confronted it will return to haunt the nation in the form of the ‘return of the
repressed’. The debate was seen as an omen of transformation in the way in which the Holo-
caust featured in collective memory in Germany. It spoke of the will to forge a new relation-
ship to the past and possibly of a new reluctance on the part of Germans to remember the
crimes of genocide. And yet the messages the debate sent were by no means clear-cut. On
one hand, the Walser–Bubis debate looked very much like a telltale sign that the postwar
German consensus about the Holocaust had begun to crack. If the Holocaust has figured, as
Dirk Moses has suggested recently, as a negative myth of origins for Germans since the 1980s,
and even longer for the German Left, then the debate appeared to challenge this negative
myth of origins. The Holocaust, it seemed to be saying, might no longer be a source of his-
torical legitimacy for the building of a new postwar German national identity.6 On the other
hand, however, the dispute was open to interpretation. Was it not possible that this was
evidence of how robust public rituals of memory in Germany were or, put another way,
of how ‘normal’ the Germans as a nation of people had become? Were the memorial
practices in question in fact not fragile but robust precisely because they were open to per-
petual contestation? If this were the case, it would be wrong to infer from the Walser–Bubis
debate that Germany is now prone to collective bouts of selective amnesia or that the Berlin
Republic marks the inauspicious beginnings of a new culture of denial and forgetting. Are
debates about memory of the Nazi past still about whether the crimes of National Socialism
are unique in the history of civilisation, as was the case with the Historikerstreit (historians’
debate) of the mid-1980s? Or is there something else at stake in more recent debates about
the Holocaust?
In the remainder of this essay I want to focus on two recent debates in Germany from the
same inaugural period of Germany’s SPD–Green government, which both have as their focus
the contestation of memory in relation to the Holocaust. In both debates the Holocaust serves
as a negative myth of origin and a primal phantasmatic scene of guilt and shame around
which German national identifications are organised. The first is the Walser–Bubis debate
and the second the much more protracted but no less fierce debate about the building of a
Holocaust memorial in Berlin, which peaked around the same time. Both debates are impor-
tant in the German context because they come at the end of a long period of Christian Demo-
cratic (CDU) rule and at the beginning of a new SPD era in German politics. They are signifi-
cant, moreover, because they appear to send contradictory messages about German self-
understanding to the international community.
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welcomed the ‘normalisation’ of Germany, especially if it leads to Germany assuming greater
moral responsibility on the international stage in preventing human-rights abuses and
genocide.52 But as Germany’s official pacifist stance on the Iraq war, and its Foreign Min-
ister’s repeated threat of a no vote on the UN Security Council have shown, Germany is a far
cry from a normal nation with a normal history. Ironically, the Iraq war has shown that a
majority of Germans are quite happy not to be considered a ‘normal’ nation with a normal
past, particularly if this normalisation means that it must be expected to engage in armed
combat without the legitimacy of a UN resolution. Indeed, the Iraq war offers a paradigmatic
example of how a type of ‘negative nationalism’ that is rooted in critical memory of the
past and an acknowledgment of past guilt can, paradoxically, contribute to fostering a sense
of national pride, even in a shameful past. It has demonstrated that national pride and nation-
al self-understanding does not have to mean forgetting a tainted past and denying the dis-
continuities and ruptures in the nation’s history. Curiously, the overwhelming support in
Germany for not participating in the Iraq war illustrates Habermas’s point that a negative
myth of origins coupled with a sense of pride in the nation’s recent democratic traditions, or
what he has called, controversially, ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Verfassungspatriotismus), does
not have to be a stumbling block in the search for a more positive sense of national identity.
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Jewry, a fate that, incidentally, also befell Kafka’s sisters and family members. Instead, he
brushes the tale against the grain of prevailing political correctness and reads it as a fable
about the fate of ordinary Germans: Germans, that is, of the likes of Martin Walser.
Walser belongs to the generation of Germans that was just old enough towards the end of
the Second World War to be called up for active service. Born in 1927, Walser was drafted
into the army as a young man during the last stages of the war. He emerged from the experi-
ence virtually unscathed, with everything but his youthful innocence intact. It is for this
reason, Schirrmacher argues, that Walser, like his characters, must surely know what it is
like to lose one’s identity overnight and wake up transformed into something as abject as
Gregor Samsa. Schirrmacher’s argument is that the metamorphosis of Germans, after the
Second World War, into a nation of culprits was the formative experience of Walser’s
generation; those born in the 1920s and 1930s awoke from youthful illusions at the end of
National Socialist rule to find themselves metamorphosed in the eyes of the world into ‘some-
thing verminlike’, into a nation of willing executioners, perpetrators and mass murderers.
At the end of his speech Schirrmacher goes on to include Walser’s fictional heroes in his
list of victims. A similar fate had befallen Walser’s ordinary, mostly male middle-class heroes
that had claimed the life of Gregor Samsa, he goes on to argue. ‘No-one should be envied for
waking up in bed as a Walser hero’, he exclaims, since to be white, middle-class and male
is, in Schirrmacher’s eyes, obviously an unenviable fate.3 (One cannot help wondering whether
this is because Walser’s heroes have been afflicted with a curse far worse than death, possi-
bly with the ‘curse’ of having to live on or simply with the shame of having survived the war.
Or perhaps it is because life must go on for Walser’s heroes, one way or another, as it did for
Walser himself, something that Schirrmacher conveniently overlooks.) Schirrmacher is
nothing but persistent in his rewriting of history and takes the increasingly preposterous
Kafka analogy one step further. Like the somewhat sentimental characters in Walser’s books,
the middle-aged writers, lawyers and public servants—ordinary Germans—are victims too,
he would have us believe, because like Gregor Samsa, Walser’s heroes all have jobs to hold
down and families to support.4
Schirrmacher’s new mythology of victims and perpetrators is unsettling, not least because
it obscures the ending of Kafka’s story. Apart from the surface similarity of the shock of the
rude awakening to a new identity, the analogy between the archetypical Walserian hero and
Gregor Samsa soon strains credibility. By contrast with Gregor Samsa, who starves to death
holed up in his room, and the six million Jews who perished in the Holocaust, Walser and
his heroes have choices: choices between sleeping on or waking up from their nightmares,
choices between life and death.
It was little surprise that Schirrmacher’s metamorphosis of Kafka’s famous story into a
parable about ordinary Germans and Walser’s speech that followed it incited a bitter debate
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Jürgen Habermas, and the recipient in 2003 was Susan Sontag. The year before Walser was
awarded the prize, the winner was Nobel prize winner-to-be Günter Grass, in many ways
Walser’s arch-rival, who had used the public occasion to deliver a hard-hitting speech about
Germany’s omissions with regard to asylum seekers. Hence, it came as no surprise that Walser
set out to provoke with his acceptance speech and to attract maximum media attention. The
speech was broadcast on national television and excerpts were printed in major daily
newspapers. The congratulatory speech with its allusions to Kafka was given by Frank
Schirrmacher, a prominent conservative journalist with a similar penchant for scandal to
Walser. Schirrmacher was the journalist largely responsible for discrediting the entirety of
East German literature and its writers from Christa Wolf to the Prenzlauer Berg group of
underground poets after the fall of the Wall, calling more generally for an end to the post-
war paradigm of littérature engagée.2
The controversy that both Walser’s and Schirrmacher’s remarks predictably sparked, now
referred to as the Walser–Bubis debate, centred on ‘Auschwitz’—as the term that Germans
tend to use when referring to the Holocaust—and how Germans should remember the crimes
of the Nazi past. At the time, the Walser–Bubis debate was widely seen as a disturbing sign
of a conservative backlash that did not augur well for the in-coming Schröder government
and the new Berlin Republic. Especially in the context of other contemporaneous debates
about the building of a Holocaust memorial, it looked very much like a left-wing govern-
ment had ushered in a conservative era in memorial politics, which threatened to under-
mine the decade-long struggles of the German Left for a more thorough and rigorous engage-
ment with the Nazi past. For Germans, who had watched the previous Kohl government’s
clumsy and often half-hearted attempts at honouring the sufferings of the victims of the Holo-
caust, the Walser–Bubis debate was an unexpected throwback to the mid-1980s. It seemed
as if the memory of the Nazi past was being contested yet again and from a section of soci-
ety where one would least expect it. To an Australian observer, accustomed to the Howard
government’s extreme reluctance to acknowledge past guilt in relation to the stolen gener-
ations, the Walser–Bubis debate also came as a shock because it appeared to shatter all faith
in the ability of the Left to confront issues of national guilt and shame head on. What seemed
interesting about Germany back in 1998 was the way that a new left-wing European
government approached the question of collective memory and a tainted national past in
relation to national identity.
Schirrmacher’s introduction to Walser’s speech obviously called for its own set of polemics.
In his remarks, Schirrmacher sets out to upset the dominant readings of Kafka’s The Meta-
morphosis by turning the story’s putative referent on its head. He reads Kafka not as a prophet
of the Holocaust and The Metamorphosis not as a story about the fate of the European
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